Google發射飛彈反擊Rockstar !

Google訴請確認未侵害Rockstar專利的訴狀

Google sues to protect Android device makers from Apple-backed patent hell (GigaOM)


Rockstar真是個熱門話題。暨傳出它打算出售自己的專利之後，目前最新的發展，是Google跳出來對Rockstar發射飛彈了：Google在北加州起訴，請法院確認Google沒有侵害Rockstar用來控告Android廠商侵權的那幾篇專利。

這個訴狀有幾個可以探討的地方。

首先，要提Declaratory Judgement，要件之一是原被告之間要有 "controversy"，不是想提就提。這個法律問題我不是很懂，不過Google在起訴狀的第一段，嘗試回答了這個問題：

1. ... Rockstar’s litigation campaign has placed a cloud on Google’s Android platform; threatened Google’s business and relationships with its customers and partners, as well as its sales of Nexus-branded Android devices; and created a justiciable controversy between Google and Rockstar.

所以看起來，就算Rockstar沒有直接找上Google，但由於Rockstar的動作 "在Android平台上罩了一片烏雲"，所以這就算是跟Google之間有controversy了。好吧，這聽起來好像也說的通。

其次，在解釋為什麼北加州法院對本案有對人管轄權的時候，Google很明顯地認為，理由之一是在背後為Rockstar操盤者，是Apple這個加州公司：

8. ... On information and belief, Rockstar’s shareholders direct and participate in Rockstar’s licensing and enforcement efforts against companies in California. For example, Apple Inc. (“Apple”) is a large shareholder in closely-held Rockstar, and maintains a seat on Rockstar’s board of directors. Rockstar’s CEO has publicly stated that Rockstar maintains regular contact with its shareholders. Apple’s headquarters are in Cupertino, California.

此外，Google也聲稱Rockstar嘗試讓加州公司不要用Android平台，干涉了Google的商業關係。哇，這個指控好像有專利濫用的問題在裡面喔：

9. ... On information and belief, Rockstar contacted and met with these California-based companies in order to discourage them from continuing to use Google’s Android platform in their devices, and to interfere with Google’s business relationships.

還有，大家記得當年包括Apple在內的幾家公司，是用45億美金標下北電的專利的嗎？依這份訴狀，其中Apple就出了26億 (真有錢啊)：

13. In June 2011, five of the world’s largest technology companies—including Google competitors Apple, Research In Motion, and Microsoft—joined forces to obtain a portfolio of patents auctioned during the bankruptcy of Nortel Networks. Bankrolled by these companies, a manufactured entity called “Rockstar Bidco” placed the winning bid of $4.5 billion. According to Apple’s June 2011 Form 10-Q filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission, Apple contributed “approximately $2.6 billion” of that sum.

最後，當年天價標出的原因，是大家認為北電網路的專利跟3G與4G相關。但是Rockstar現在拿出來起訴的專利，好像跟3G或4G是完全沒關係。比如US 5,838,551這篇，其實是跟EMI遮蔽技術相關：

29. In the Android OEM Actions, Rockstar accuses Android OEM defendants ASUS, HTC, Huawei, LG, Pantech, and Samsung of infringing the ’551 patent in that each “makes, uses, sells, offers for sale, imports, exports, supplies and/or distributes within the United States” devices incorporating Google’s Android platform, which devices allegedly include “at least one electronic package comprising a component that is located between an EMI shield and a ground member for performing shielding operations” where “[t]he EMI shield is incorporated into the electronic package, which is then mounted to a circuit board” in the accused devices. In its complaint against ASUS, which manufactures the Nexus 7, Rockstar specifically accuses the Nexus 7, a device offered for sale by Google.

值得注意的是，雖然這跟Android應該沒有什麼關聯，但Rockstar仍只挑Android產品打。當然，我們也可以說這只是Rockstar的訴訟策略：Nexus 7只是起訴用的產品而已，隨著訴訟的進行，Rockstar會陸續加入其它非Android的產品。

至於其它的專利與什麼技術相關，依訴狀的內容整理如下：

• US 5,838,551：電磁干擾遮蔽
• US 6,037,937：檢視不動產用的圖形使用者介面 (navigable graphical user interface (‘navigable GUI’) that permits a user to manipulate and control the contents of the display to maximize the use of display real estate.)
• US 6,128,298：行動熱點 (Mobile Hotspot functionality [which] is designed to route data packets between wireless devices tethered to the Mobile Hotspot to nodes on a public network such as the Internet.)
• US 6,333,973：整合訊息中心 (integrated notification message center.)
• US 6,463,131：訊息與通知功能 (Messaging and Notification functionality.)
• US 6,765,591：VPN的管理功能 (VPN management functionality.)
• US 6,937,572：定位服務功能 (Location Services functionality.)

由以上可以看出，這些專利全都跟3G與4G通信沒有關係，而是跟行動裝置的特定功能，或甚至跟硬體設計相關。難怪之前傳出Rockstar要賣專利時，有消息指出打算賣的專利跟現在起訴Android陣營的專利無關。可能買家還是對工業標準相關專利比較有興趣吧。

除了訴狀之外，這個訴訟本身也有幾個點可以觀察。

首先，Google並不是參加Rockstar發起的那些專利侵權訴訟，而是自己發起一個新的確認之訴。那麼這個訴訟跟原本的訴訟，會發生哪些關聯性就值得觀察。比如說，原本的訴訟會不會暫停，等這個確認之訴的結果呢？這些訴訟會不會被合併呢？這就要看各家廠商的訴訟策略了。

還有，Google沒有直接參加Rockstar發起的那些專利侵權訴訟，原因有可能是因為Google提供了Android程式碼，卻不負任何專利侵權擔保責任。(這是不是寫在GPL裡面？我有點忘了。) 所以Google不需要直接參與多個訴訟 (這樣律師費很多)，直接起一個新的訴訟就好 (律師費低的多)，下游廠商們也沒有辦法把Google告進來 (比如這件)。唉，這就是產業的現實吧。

再者，產品是否侵權的判斷，跟產品本身的設計有關。如果侵權與否的關鍵不在Android本身，那麼這個訴訟可能就對被Rockstar起訴的被告們幫助有限。比如說，EMI遮蔽設計侵不侵權，其實跟Android本身一點關係都沒有；又比如其實專利侵權的重點，是在Android上層的，廠商自己開發的APP上，廠商又不願意揭露程式碼給Google。就這兩種狀況，Google這個訴訟對廠商的幫助，可能就不大了。

最後，對於某些把Android拿去改，進而開發出了自己的作業系統的廠商，Google應該就不會這樣力挺。因此Google也藉此釋放出一個訊息：我只會力挺用我所開發出來的Android的廠商，不會理利用Android去改出自己作業系統的廠商。(不過話又說回來，Rockstar也沒在理那些利用Android去改出自己作業系統的廠商就是了。)

總而言之，Google說的故事是，Rockstar是由大股東Apple在背後操盤，拿跟Android不直接相關的專利來攻擊Android陣營，目的為擾亂Android的生意運作，所以我現在出來主張Android其實沒有侵害這些專利，來力挺我的合作夥伴。這策略是否會成功，讓我們繼續觀察下去吧。

News: Apple-Backed Rockstar Said to Hold Discussions to Sell Patents (Bloomberg)

Apple-Backed Rockstar Said to Hold Discussions to Sell Patents (Bloomberg)

蘋果天價買北電專利 傳求售 (CNA)


繼今年10月對多家廠商起訴專利侵權之後，Rockstar的下一個新聞，居然是打算出售自己的專利。

Rockstar的專利是2011年從北電網路移轉過來的。當年北電網路因破產而拍賣其專利時，由於許多專利跟3G及4G技術相關，因此成交價是天價。但是依後來的發展，如果一個專利與工業標準相關，那麼專利權人不但聲請禁制令越來越難 (比如請看這裡或這裡)，算出來的權利金也偏低 (比如請看這裡或這裡)。也就是說，關於工業標準相關專利，其運用整體而言越來越困難，價值也越來越低。

基於這個趨勢，當Rockstar向業界收取權利金時，潛在被授權人可能會考慮把專利分成 (A) 工業標準專利、(B) 跟零組件相關的非工業標準專利、以及 (C) 整個系統相關的非工業標準專利三類，然後三類分開來談。(事實上這個分類可以更細，比如這邊就分成五類。)

首先關於 (A) 工業標準專利，因為它沒有辦法迴避，所以本來是價值相對較高。但是現在這類專利的價值降低了。所以潛在被授權人可以要求以低價取得這類專利的授權，而這個要求專利權人現在很難拒絕的。

然後關於 (B) 跟零組件相關的非工業標準專利，系統業者可以依其與零組件業者之間的合約，要求零組件業者出來解決 (比如這件ASUS訴請SIS擔保的訴訟)。當然這簽涉到另一個合約問題了，而且也不一定有好的結果。比如HTC在英國跟Nokia打專利訴訟，回頭要求零組件廠迴避設計卻似乎不太順利。關於這點，只能提醒系統業者多注意這個問題。

最後關於 (C) 整個系統相關的非工業標準專利，通常比較容易迴避設計。當這部份被獨立出來談，可談的空間就很大了。如果系統業者可以迴避設計，那麼除非專利權人的專利件數非常多，多到迴避設計很麻煩，還不如付錢買設計自由，否則通常都可以堅持下去，直到談出一個雙方都可接受的結果為止。

當一包專利被拆解處理，有創意的解決方案也會越來越多。比如，潛在的被授權人可以就 (A) 類專利支付合理的授權金 (金額遠低於當初專利移轉的價格)，然後就 (B) 類專利由零組件廠商解決，(C) 類專利由系統廠商解決。如果任一廠商支付費用，這個費用除了取得傳統的專利授權之外，還可以考慮取得一部份專利權本身，取得該些專利相關的後續利益，或是專利權人的部份股權等等。

其實這些模式，以前都出現過，大家並不陌生 (這裡有一些粗淺的入門介紹)，只不過廠商的組合不同，或是模式的組合不同而已。

真正重要的，是了解這個新遊戲的規則，並儘早計算風險，不要一味的只會迴避。當專利都轉到專門主張專利權的NPE手上，而你在人家的戰場上作生意，卻完全不了解它，沒有儘早參與這個新遊戲，那麼在那個戰場上，你就可能會變成NPE的攻擊對象了。屆時付出的成本，說不定還更高。這點真的只能說是不可不注意。

Rockstar的後續發展，大家一起來密切注意吧。

愛莉絲：最高法院，我來了!

CLS Bank v. Alice Corp.：今年五月CAFC吵成一團的en banc判決文

Supreme Court Docket：Petition Granted on Dec. 6, 2013


今年五月CAFC就CLS Bank v. Alice Corp.一案，進行了en banc hearing。結果11個法官先落跑一個 (Judge Taranto落跑了)，然後剩下的10位法官吵成一團，最後生出了七份意見，而且沒有一份有超過五個法官加入。

這個案子當時由Lourie法官執筆的意見勝出，其意見包括他自己，總共有五位法官加入。Rader法官執筆的反方意見落敗，包括他自己有四位法官加入。Rader法官很顯然心情很不好，在他罕見的reflection (七份意見的最後一份) 中，他最後一段是這樣寫的：

As I start my next quarter century of judicial experience, I am sure that one day I will reflect on this moment as well. I can only hope it is a brighter reflection than I encounter today.

這話應該說的算重的了吧。

這個案子Alice Corp在敗訴之後，馬上在眾所期待中 (?) 上訴了。聯邦最高法院已經在12月6日受理了喔。預計明年判決文就會出來了吧。

本案系爭專利一共有四件，其中爭議最大的，是US 7,149,720 "Systems for exchanging an obligation" 的claim 1：

1. A data processing system to enable the exchange of an obligation between parties, the system comprising:

a data storage unit having stored therein information about a shadow credit record and shadow debit record for a party, independent from a credit record and debit record maintained by an exchange institution; and

a computer, coupled to said data storage unit, that is configured to 

    (a) receive a transaction;

    (b) electronically adjust said shadow credit record and/or said shadow debit record in order to effect an exchange obligation arising from said transaction, allowing only those transactions that do not result in a value of said shadow debit record being less than a value of said shadow credit record; and

    (c) generate an instruction to said exchange institution at the end of a period of time to adjust said credit record and/or said debit record in accordance with the adjustment of said shadow credit record and/or said shadow debit record, wherein said instruction being an irrevocable, time invariant obligation placed on said exchange institution.

這個claim所描述的概念不難：針對一筆交易，先調整另一筆獨立的影子信貸資料，等到一段時間後，再依影子信貸資料調整交易機關的真正信貸資料。這是由來已久的 "第三方託管 (escrow)" 的概念，只是寫成由電腦來實施而已。

雙方吵成一團的爭點，在於 "這個claim是否屬於美國專利法101條的可專利標的"。依美國專利法101條，可專利標的有四種：程序、機器、製品、物質的組合：

Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.

除了法條之外，美國聯邦最高法院在1972年的Gottschalk v. Benson案中，明確地列出三個可專利標的例外：自然現象、心智活動、抽象概念：

Phenomena of nature, though just discovered, mental processes, and abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable, as they are the basic tools of scientific and technological work.

關於這三個可專利標的例外，從1972年之後，有一系列的案件都在討論這個問題，而這些案件有很多都跟演算法與商業方法有關。(有興趣研究者，可以參考Bitlaw的這篇文章：The History of Software Patents: From Benson, Flook, and Diehr to Bilski and Mayo v. Prometheus。) 然而最神奇的是，判決越來越多，居然對澄清這個問題似乎沒有幫助。大家前仆後繼地在法院挑戰軟體與商業方法專利，法院有的說是可專利標的有的說不是，然後說出的標準大家又似乎看不懂，搞到最後在這個案子裡，連法官都吵成一團。

在這個案子中，勝出的Lourie法官認為，這個claim 1雖然寫成系統，但是它仍然只涵括了 "第三方託管" 這個抽象概念，不會因為加上了具體的儲存裝置與電腦就變成不是抽象概念。在他的意見的最後一句，他是這樣寫的：

Abstract methods do not become patent-eligible machines by being clothed in computer language.

Rader法官不同意系統項應該跟方法項 "同生共死" 這個觀念。他研究了1952年美國專利法修法的過程、法條本身、以及之前美國聯邦最高法院的判決先例之後，認為雖然對應的方法項是抽象概念，但對應的系統項已經落實到用軟硬體來實施，且包括具體的實施動作，所以已經不是 "抽象概念" 了。他在意見中關於系統項的結論是這樣的：

Here, the claim recites a machine and other steps to enable transactions. The claim begins with the machine acquiring data and ends with the machine exchanging financial instructions with other machines. The “abstract idea” present here is not disembodied at all, but is instead integrated into a system utilizing machines.

現在，這個爭議頗大的案件，已經上到最高法院囉。大家看看最高法院會怎樣收拾這個局面吧。

最後，除了這個案子之外，還有另一個Ultramercial v. Hulu案，也值得注意。關於該案我曾經寫過一個很非常簡單的整理，大家可以參考看看喔。

Nokia v. HTC in UK: 關於禁制令的重點整理

UK High Court 判決文原文 (December 3, 2013)

FOSS Patents的報導

HTC的證交所重大訊息公告 (December 4, 2013)


12月3日英國High Court同意了Nokia請法院頒發禁制令，禁止HTC銷售侵害Nokia專利的產品。以下整理幾個重點，供大家參考。

這個案子我覺得可以讓公司法務當成內部給研發與採購宣導的教案，也可以作為跟供應商要求提早提供迴避設計料件時使用的例子。至少在英國，專利權人勝訴後要拿到禁制令相對美國容易，不能等判決出來了，才開始進行迴避。受美式訓練的系統廠商法務們關於這點可能要多留意。

第32段：在英國，准許禁制令的關鍵在於它不是 "grossly disproportionate" 。(試譯為 "顯不相當" )

... Drawing these threads together, I consider that Article 3(2) of the Enforcement Directive permits and requires the court to refuse to grant an injunction where it would be disproportionate to grant one even having regard to the requirements of efficacy and dissuasiveness. Where the right sought to be enforced by the injunction is a patent, however, the court must be very cautious before making an order which is tantamount to a compulsory licence in circumstances where no compulsory licence would be available. It follows that, where no other countervailing right is in play, the burden on the party seeking to show that the injunction would be disproportionate is a heavy one. I suspect that the practical effect of this approach is little different to Pumfrey J's test of "grossly disproportionate".

這個見解不免令人想到美國聯邦最高法院的ebay案，其改變了美國法院關於專利侵權訴訟案中頒發永久禁制令的標準。現在在美國即使專利法規定專利權是排它權，專利權人勝訴後要拿到禁制令排除他人實施，法院也必須考量四個衡平法上的因素：(1) 不可回復的損害、(2) 損害賠償不能適當地填補這個損害、(3) 原被告難處的平衡、以及 (4) 是否影響公眾利益。這很明顯比英國來的難多了。

英國看來是主要考慮因素是顯不相當。專利權人勝訴後要拿到禁制令，相對於美國容易。此外，從英國的觀點，不給禁制令只判損害賠償，感覺讓被告等於拿到了一個強制授權。這個觀點也值得思考。

第44段：HTC One旗艦機種2014第一季要在英國上市了？

"HTC is close to launching the successor flagship model to the HTC One. HTC has not revealed the launch date. Nokia has adduced evidence which suggests that the launch date is in the first quarter of 2014 and possibly as early as February 2014. HTC has not contradicted this."

哇，這真的是不小心抖出的消息耶。

第44段：到法院說話要小心啊。

"HTC's witness Brad Lin claims in paragraph 11 of his first witness statement that "The features of the chips selected by HTC [for the new phone] are unknown to HTC, and hence I do not know if they infringe EP 024". As expressed, the first part of this sentence is simply incredible. I shall assume that what Mr Lin means is that HTC does not know if the chips have the features of claim 1 of the Patent. The significance of that assertion, even assuming it is correct, depends on what efforts HTC has made to find this out, which neither Mr Lin nor any other witness reveals."

送到法院的文件，真的要很小心，說錯一句話都會被法官抓到。這邊法官說的是對的：說 "我不知道晶片裡的技術，所以我不知道它是不是侵害專利" 這個邏輯是真的有問題，應該是說 "我不知道晶片裡有沒有侵害專利的技術" 才對。

往後大家送宣誓書進法院，真的要逐句檢查啊。

第55-56段：Nokia就算變成patent troll，而不用作產品賺錢，也跟頒發禁制令與否無關。

In reality, what counsel for HTC meant was that Nokia was not interested in extracting money from exploitation of the patented invention by obtaining a monopoly price for its own goods as opposed to granting licences. But why does this matter? Whether the test for granting damages in lieu of an injunction is oppression (Shelfer/Jaggard), gross disproportionality (Navitaire) or even plain proportionality, the key question is the impact of the injunction on the defendant (Shelfer question 4). Of course the effect of denial of the injunction on the patentee must be considered (Shelfer questions 1-3), but why does it matter whether the effect is to deprive the patentee of the ability to charge a monopoly price for his own goods or merely to deprive him of the ability to charge an enhanced royalty in respect of the defendant's goods?

It seems to me that the answer to the question may be the opposite to that contended for by counsel for HTC. Where the patentee is intent on charging a monopoly price for his goods and for that reason refuses to grant consensual licences, the effect of an injunction may be to exclude the defendant from the relevant market unless the defendant has a non-infringing alternative. In some circumstances, that may be grossly disproportionate. Where, on the other hand, the patentee is willing to grant consensual licences, and seeks an injunction to compel the defendant to accept his commercial terms, the effect of the injunction will not be to exclude the defendant from the relevant market even if the defendant has no non-infringing alternative. Indeed, where the patentee has already granted licences to third parties, the effect of an injunction may simply be to prevent the defendant from exploiting the patented invention more cheaply than the third parties. It will be observed that, in either scenario, the effect of the injunction is crucially dependent on the availability of non-infringing alternatives....

這邊英國法官的邏輯值得思考。他的意思是說：

(1) 如果專利權人不想授權 (原因是只想把這個專利技術用在自家產品上，讓自家產品賣貴一點)，然後對他人的產品要禁制令，則禁制令的效果是把他人逐出市場，除非他人能找到不侵權的替代方案。某些情況下這有顯不相當的問題。

(2) 如果專利權人願意授權，那麼就算他人找不到不侵權的替代方案，對他人的產品要禁制令的效果並不是將他人逐出市場。在專利權人已經授權與第三人的情況下，禁制令的效果是避免他人更便宜地實施專利技術。

這跟美國的邏輯不同。如果是美國法官，應該會說，反正專利權人願意收權利金，用錢可以解決，那就沒有 " 不可回復的損害"，也無所謂 "損害賠償不能適當地填補這個損害"。那判損害賠償就好了，不能給禁制令。

第61-62段：因為零件而對系統產品頒禁制令OK。

... Counsel for HTC argued strongly that an injunction would be grossly disproportionate because the infringing circuits were only very small components of much larger and more complicated commercial products, viz. HTC's smartphones. For example, the Qualcomm WTR1605 chip is just one component out of about 670 components in the HTC One phone, and the chip contains other circuits in addition to the infringing one. I entirely accept that this is so. But why does it matter? I shall leave on one side the effect of the order for delivery up which normally accompanies an injunction, because that is a one-off effect which can, if appropriate, be addressed in other ways. So far as the future effect of an injunction is concerned, I cannot see that the mere fact that the injunction only relates to a small component of a larger whole is significant.

Counsel for HTC relied on the traditional analogy of a patented rivet (or sometimes it is a whistle) on a battleship. An injunction to restrain infringement of that patent by the battleship manufacturer (as opposed to the rivet supplier) would be disproportionate, he argued. But this depends on what the effect of the injunction actually is. If the battleship manufacturer has immediate access to a non-infringing alternative rivet, then the effect of the injunction on him will simply be the cost, if any, of switching from the patented rivet to the non-infringing one (both any one-off costs such as changing the production line and any ongoing cost differential in the component price). Of course, if the cost of switching from the patented rivet to a non-infringing rivet is prohibitive for some reason, then in practice the non-infringing rivet will not be a realistic alternative. Thus whether the injunction is disproportionate depends on the availability and cost of non-infringing alternatives.

我的理解是，是否應該因為零件的侵權而對系統產品頒禁制令，關鍵仍為是否構成 "grossly disproportionate"，而是否會構成grossly disproportionate需考量不侵權替代方案的成本。

如果禁制令造成被告太高的成本，比如為了一顆找不到替代方案的鉚釘而禁售一艘戰艦，那可能有grossly disproportionate的問題。但本案沒有這個問題。

第65段：是否有不侵權替代方案是關鍵。

... As I have said an important consideration, and perhaps the single most important consideration, in assessing whether the grant of an injunction to restrain patent infringement would be disproportionate is the availability and cost of non-infringing alternatives.

這跟上面重複，就不多說了。

第70段：

HTC does not dispute that these non-infringing alternative chips are already available to it (although it says that the Qualcomm RTR6285 and RTR6285A transceiver chips are outdated), or it will be able to source other non-infringing alternatives given sufficient time. Nor does it suggest that the cost of switching to a non-infringing alternative is prohibitive given sufficient time. Rather, HTC's evidence is that it will take (a) an unknown length of time for it to source a non-infringing alternative to the Qualcomm WTR1605(L) chip and (b) between 4 and 12 months to rebuild its phones around non-infringing chips. It is also HTC's evidence that the Broadcom BCM4335 cannot be swapped pin-for-pin for the BCM4334, and that it would take about 12 months to rebuild the One Mini with the BCM4335....

基本上法官覺得，就算不知道找不侵權替代晶片要多久，就算找到也要花4-12個月才能重作出有不侵權替代晶片的成品，成本不是很高。用12個月用BCM4335來重作成品，法官好像也認為還好。

可是大家都知道，12個月之後產品說不定都下市了啊。

其實我猜，從上下文來看，法官心裡想的是：(1) 一直都有不侵權替代方案，只是Qualcomm的已經out of date，Broadcom的又不是pin-to-pin相容而已；(2) Nokia 18個月之前就在德國告你了，如果你說要12個月，現在應該也快準備好了，是HTC你自己沒有提早準備。

看來HTC的律師強調 "迴避設計成本太高" 這個點失敗，並沒有強調到讓法官覺得到了grossly disproportionate的程度吧。這部份只能說完全看法官了。要是我，我會覺得要12個月重作成本很高耶，已經是grossly disproportionate了啦。

第72段：

It is convenient, however, to address at this juncture the fact that, as explained in my previous judgment, Broadcom and Qualcomm both regard their chip layouts as highly confidential and are vigilant to protect that confidentiality. HTC suggests that this has somehow handicapped HTC in ascertaining whether the chips in its phones infringe the Patent and in obtaining non-infringing alternatives. There is no evidence, however, that HTC ever asked either Broadcom or Qualcomm whether any of the chips in issue had the features of claim 1 of the Patent and was met with either a denial or a refusal to answer. Nor has HTC revealed whether or nor either Broadcom or Qualcomm has expressly indemnified it against infringement of the Patent, or, if not, whether it considers that either Broadcom or Qualcomm had impliedly done so.

法官說HTC沒有提出關於以下的證據： (1) HTC有沒有問過供應商晶片是否侵權，以及 (2) 供應商是否有明示或默示的擔保。

HTC沒有提證據的理由不難猜吧：(1) 說不定是有問過，結果是有，所以沒有留證據 (訴訟打完也是有侵權)，(2) 大晶片廠沒有在擔保下游廠商的吧，所以當然沒有相關證據。

第83段：HTC沒有講它作了什麼準備，Qualcomm也不太理它。

.... HTC has not adduced any evidence as to what contingency plans it made in case there should be a finding of infringement of the Patent. HTC had over 18 months from the commencement of the German proceedings on 2 May 2012 to the hearing on the form of order on 28 November 2013 in which to make contingency plans. Even from the date of Nokia's cross-action on 23 July 2012, HTC had over 16 months. HTC's evidence is almost entirely silent as to what it was doing in this period to prepare for any injunction. It does not reveal whether, or if so when, HTC asked Broadcom or Qualcomm whether the chips which HTC was buying from them had the features of claim 1 of the Patent. Nor, save in one respect, does it reveal whether, or if so when, HTC asked Broadcom or Qualcomm to design non-infringing alternatives or, if so, with what result. All that is said is that, at the time that Nokia introduced its allegation that the Qualcomm chips infringed (which I take to mean late March 2013), HTC asked Qualcomm to provide a workaround and (so it is said) Qualcomm refused. According to HTC, it is only on 26 November 2013 that Qualcomm changed its position and agreed to look into the possibility of a workaround.

看來HTC是曾經要求Qualcomm提早提供迴避設計的晶片，結果Qualcomm直到上個月底侵權判決出來了，才同意看看迴避的可行性。

唉，HTC好可憐。