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2016年11月2日 星期三

CAFC判決整理 (10/1~10/15)

APPLE INC. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. (Fed. Cir., October 7, 2016) (en banc)

這個判決我已經寫過文章囉


FAIRWARNING IP, LLC v. IATRIC SYSTEMS, INC. (Fed. Cir., October 11, 2016)

原告主張被告侵害其美國專利第8,578,500號。被告依美國聯邦民事訴訟法第12(b)(6),主張原告專利不適格,聲請撤訴 (這訴訟策略我們提過好多次了,比如這邊)。地院支持被告,上訴法院確認。本案請求項不適格。

聯邦巡迴上訴法院在這個案子中,將本案的請求項與最近的幾個案子做了比較。我整理在下面,大家可比對判決文原文參考看看:

Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstrom S.A., No. 15-1778, 2016 WL 4073318, at *3 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 1, 2016) 
... “realm of abstract ideas” includes “collecting information, including when limited to particular content.”
We ... “treated analyzing information by steps people go through in their minds, or by mathematical algorithms, without more, as essentially mental processes within the abstract-idea category.” 
... “merely presenting the results of abstract processes of collecting and analyzing information, without more (such as identifying a particular tool for presentation), is abstract as an ancillary part of such collection and analysis.” 
McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games America Inc., No. 15-1080, 2016 WL 4896481 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 13, 2016)
 ... “it [was] the incorporation of the claimed rules, not the use of the computer, that ‘improved [the] existing technological process’ by allowing the automation of further tasks.”
The claims here are more like those in Alice than McRO. FairWarning’s claims merely implement an old practice in a new environment.
 Although FairWarning’s claims require the use of a computer, it is this incorporation of a computer, not the claimed rule, that purportedly “improve[s] [the] existing technological process” by allowing the automation of further tasks.  
Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (這個案子我們介紹過)
In that case, we explained that the claims were “specifically directed to a self-referential table for a computer database.”... The claims were thus “directed to a specific improvement to the way computers operate,” rather than an abstract idea implemented on a computer. 
The claims here, in contrast, are not directed to an improvement in the way computers operate, nor does FairWarning contend as much. While the claimed system and method certainly purport to accelerate the process of analyzing audit log data, the speed increase comes from the capabilities of a general-purpose computer, rather than the patented method itself.
Thus here, as in Electric Power, “the focus of the claims is not on . . . an improvement in computers as tools, but on certain independently abstract ideas that use computers as tools.” 
DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
... to the extent that FairWarning suggests that its claimed invention recites a technological advance relating to accessing and combining disparate information sources, its claims do not recite any such improvement. Rather, the claimed invention is directed to the broad concept of monitoring audit log data.
The claims here do not propose a solution or overcome a problem “specifically arising in the realm of computer [technology].” 

IN RE: ANDERSON (Fed. Cir., October 13, 2016)

USPTO認為Lawrence E. Anderson (他是發明人、申請人、而且自己就是專利律師) 的兩個申請案都基於pre-AIA §102(b) 或 § 103(a) 而無效。聯邦巡迴上訴法院確認了USPTO的決定。


MIT v. SHIRE PHARMACEUTICALS, INC. (Fed. Cir., October 13, 2016)

麻省理工學院訴Shire Pharma的 "Dermagraft®"(Shire Pharma已於2014年把Dermagraft賣給Organogenesis了) 侵害其美國專利第5,770,1935,759,830號。主要的爭點,在於請求項中的 "vascularized organ tissue" 到底包不包括皮膚組織。Shire Pharma認為不包括。

這兩個專利經歷了非常漫長的申請過程。最早的母案是1986年申請的,直到1998年,這兩個子案才獲證。這個申請過程,以及後續的影響,值得看一下。

在漫長的申請過程中,麻省理工學院曾經在某個子案的請求項,加入過 “non-skin organ cells" 這個限制條件。由於加入這個條件沒用,麻省理工學院後續的申請策略改變了兩次:第一次刪掉了“non-skin organ cells" 這個限制,改成強調細胞群的厚度;第二次又改成強調 “to produce functional vascularized organ tissue in vivo” 這個限制條件。

被告主張這個申請過程,適用申請過程放棄原則 (doctrine of prosecution disclaimer)。Doctrine of prosecution disclaimer很簡單:在申請過程中,曾經放棄過的特定請求項解釋,日後不能回復:

“The doctrine of prosecution disclaimer . . . preclud[es] patentees from recapturing through claim interpretation specific meanings disclaimed during prosecution.” Omega Eng’g, Inc. v. Raytek Corp., 334 F.3d 1314, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2003).

要適用這個原則,申請人的放棄必須 "清楚而無錯誤 (clear and unmistakable)":

“[I]n order for prosecution disclaimer to attach, the disavowal must be both clear and unmistakable.” 3M Innovative Props. Co. v. Tredegar Corp., 725 F.3d 1315, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2013).

聯邦巡迴上訴法院認為,本案不適用申請過程放棄原則,因為被告舉出的證據,都沒法符合 "clear and unmistakable" 的標準。這中間的關鍵在於,從申請歷史過程可以看的出來,麻省理工學院曾經基於審查委員的核駁,而放棄了 "non-skin" 這個限制條件。所以最後核准的請求項中,“vascularized organ tissue” 這個用語沒有 "non-skin" 這個限制。法官認為熟悉該項技術者,看了這個過程,應會認為“vascularized organ tissue” 包括 "skin" :

MIT tried to narrow the application claims early in prosecution to exclude skin organ cells, but the examiner rejected the “non-skin” limitation under § 112 as new matter. MIT never again sought to limit the claims to exclude skin organ cells.  Had the examiner actually agreed with MIT’s arguments and allowed the proposed amendments, the claims could well have a different claim scope. But the examiner did not, and MIT took a different approach. Since claims to “vascularized organ tissue” were ultimately allowed over the prior art without the proposed “non-skin” amendment, it is difficult to infer that a skilled artisan would interpret other isolated statements by MIT during the course of the prosecution history as a clear and unmistakable disclaimer of claim scope. 

從本案可以看出,美國知名大學對於專利申請的重視,以及日後他們是真的會在法院,主張其費盡千辛萬苦才獲准的專利權。這些都值得我們參考。


POLY-AMERICA, L.P. v. API INDUSTRIES, INC. (Fed. Cir., October 14, 2016)

原告的美國專利第8,702,308號的請求項第10項中,並沒有限制 "short seal" 的寬度,也沒有限制袋口寬度與袋子寬度的關係 (另兩個獨立項有)。然而,由於幾個理由,法院在解釋請求項時,還是用這些關係限制了請求項第10項的範圍。

這個判決文值得寫專利說明書的人一讀。至少要知道說明書是寫了甚麼,日後會讓法官把請求項所沒有的限制條件讀入請求項吧。


ENDO PHARMACEUTICALS INC. v. ACTAVIS LABORATORIES UT, INC. (Fed. Cir., October 14, 2016)

本案與睪酮透過皮膚進入人體的技術有關。地方法院認為專利有效,且被告產品侵權。上訴法院確認。


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