美國專利侵權分析：基本觀念相關重要判決整理 (一)

美國專利侵權分析：基本觀念相關重要判決整理 (二)


以下整理了一些與美國專利侵權分析基本觀念相關的重要判決，供大家參考。我把相關的重點觀念用中文寫出來，加上判決文中跟這個觀念相關的文字，最後再加上判決原文的連結 (多半是Google Scholar的連結)，方便大家交叉查詢。有些我之前有討論過的，也順便附上之前討論的文章連結。

相信大家看的出來，這些判決大部份都是最近這幾年作出的。有些判決因為太新，citation似乎還沒出來。如果有需要，請在判決原文中，用CTRL-F搜尋，應該就可以找到我引用的文字的位置了。部份專利法相關的爭議問題，實務見解還在發展中，真的要時時注意最新進展呢。

整理出來的好處，是在寫侵權分析意見時，可以方便引用。我想常常寫美國專利侵權分析意見的人，應該自己都會維護一個類似像這樣的清單吧。不然每次都要作法律研究，找citation，很麻煩。

此外，也可以把下面的內容當成一個基本觀念清單，時時複習一下。這些判決任何一個都很重要，如果有不清楚的，那應該是沒辦法處理美國專利侵權爭議案件喔。像我這種極度健忘的人，就需要常複習。

最後，如果需要進一步資料，我推薦2015年版的Patent Case Management Judicial Guide。它是免費的，整理的相當完整，很值得參考喔。



申請專利範圍的解釋


Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996)：美國專利訴訟的侵權認定分成兩個部份：申請專利範圍的解釋，以及被控產品是否落入解釋的範圍。前者為法律問題，後者為事實問題：

The two elements of a simple patent case, construing the patent and determining whether infringement occurred, were characterized by the former patent practitioner, Justice Curtis."The first is a question of law, to be determined by the court, construing the letters-patent, and the description of the invention and specification of claim annexed to them. The second is a question of fact, to be submitted to a jury."

517 U.S. at 384.


Teva Pharmaceuticals USA v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831 (2015)：如果在解釋申請專利範圍時，對相關的事實認定有爭議，上訴法院不可重新審理，只能審酌下級法院在認定相關事實時有無明顯錯誤 (這個案子可視為Markman案的進一步說明)：

In some cases, however, the district court will need to look beyond the patent's intrinsic evidence and to consult extrinsic evidence in order to understand, for example, the background science or the meaning of a term in the relevant art during the relevant time period. .... In cases where those subsidiary facts are in dispute, courts will need to make subsidiary factual findings about that extrinsic evidence. These are the "evidentiary underpinnings" of claim construction that we discussed in Markman, and this subsidiary factfinding must be reviewed for clear error on appeal."  

135 S. Ct. at 841.


Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F. 3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc)：解釋申請專利範圍時，需審酌各種內部與外部證據。不同證據的重要性雖有不同，唯審酌方式沒有硬性的規則 (這個案子可以配合上面的Teva案一併閱讀與理解)：

The sequence of steps used by the judge in consulting various sources is not important; what matters is for the court to attach the appropriate weight to be assigned to those sources in light of the statutes and policies that inform patent law. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582. In Vitronics, we did not attempt to provide a rigid algorithm for claim construction, but simply attempted to explain why, in general, certain types of evidence are more valuable than others. Today, we adhere to that approach and reaffirm the approach to claim construction outlined in that case, in Markman, and in Innova.

415 F. 3d at 1324.

(Note：這個案子把解釋申請專利範圍的規則整個整理了一遍，說是教材也不為過喔。建議直接閱讀判決原文。)


Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc)：申請專利範圍的文字是否適用112條第(f)段「功能附加手段」的規定，使用法定用語與否會造成不同的推定效果，唯不存在「強烈的推定」這個概念：

[W]e should abandon characterizing as "strong" the presumption that a limitation lacking the word "means" is not subject to § 112, para. 6.... When a claim term lacks the word "means," the presumption can be overcome and § 112, para. 6 will apply if the challenger demonstrates that the claim term fails to "recite sufficiently definite structure" or else recites "function without reciting sufficient structure for performing that function." Watts, 232 F.3d at 880. The converse presumption remains unaffected: "use of the word `means' creates a presumption that § 112, ¶ 6 applies." Personalized Media, 161 F.3d at 703.

[Fairsky's Patent Memo之前關於本案的討論]


Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120 (2014)：申請專利範圍是否明確，採「合理確定 (reasonable certainty)」原則認定：在配合說明書與申請歷史之後，申請專利範圍是否合理確定地讓熟習該項技藝者能了解其範圍：

In place of the "insolubly ambiguous" standard, we hold that a patent is invalid for indefiniteness if its claims, read in light of the specification delineating the patent, and the prosecution history, fail to inform, with reasonable certainty, those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention. 

134 S. Ct. at 2124.

(Note：在Teva案之後，申請專利範圍是否明確這個問題，能否在訴訟過程中的申請專利範圍解釋的階段就能釐清，值得觀察。)



被控產品是否落入解釋的範圍


Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F. 2d 931 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (en banc)：全要件原則同時適用於文義侵權與均等論的判斷：

[E]ach element of a claim is material and essential, and that in order for a court to find infringement, the plaintiff must show the presence of every element or its substantial equivalent in the accused device.

833 F. 2d at 935.


Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997)：兩種均等論的判斷方法：(1) 功能-手段-結果三段測試，(2) 非實質差別測試。兩者應視個案事實運用。重點是均等論比對是元件與元件比對：

There seems to be substantial agreement that, while the triple identity test may be suitable for analyzing mechanical devices, it often provides a poor framework for analyzing other products or processes. On the other hand, the insubstantial differences test offers little additional guidance as to what might render any given difference "insubstantial."

In our view, the particular linguistic framework used is less important than whether the test is probative of the essential inquiry: Does the accused product or process contain elements identical or equivalent to each claimed element of the patented invention? Different linguistic frameworks may be more suitable to different cases, depending on their particular facts.

520 U.S. at 40.


Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002)：可抗辯的禁反言：禁反言推定阻卻均等論的適用，唯專利權人可舉證在修改申請專利範圍時，熟習相關技藝者無法被期待寫出可涵蓋均等物的申請專利範圍，以推翻此推定：

When the patentee has chosen to narrow a claim, courts may presume the amended text was composed with awareness of this rule and that the territory surrendered is not an equivalent of the territory claimed. In those instances, however, the patentee still might rebut the presumption that estoppel bars a claim of equivalence. The patentee must show that at the time of the amendment one skilled in the art could not reasonably be expected to have drafted a claim that would have literally encompassed the alleged equivalent.

 535 U.S. at 741.


SciMed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2001)：均等論無法涵蓋在專利中已明確排除的技術特徵：

A particular structure can be deemed outside the reach of the doctrine of equivalents because that structure is clearly excluded from the claims whether the exclusion is express or implied.

242 F.3d at 1345.

(Note：建議閱讀判決本文，以理解何謂「在專利中已明確排除」。這對專利說明書的寫作很重要喔。)


Johnson & Johnston Assocs. Inc. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (en banc)：貢獻公眾理論比均等論優先：

[W]hen a patent drafter discloses but declines to claim subject matter, as in this case, this action dedicates that unclaimed subject matter to the public. Application of the doctrine of equivalents to recapture subject matter deliberately left unclaimed would "conflict with the primacy of the claims in defining the scope of the patentee's exclusive right." 

Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assocs., 904 F.2d 677 (Fed. Cir. 1990)：申請專利範圍的均等範圍不能涵蓋習知技術。

[A] patentee should not be able to obtain, under the doctrine of equivalents, coverage which he could not lawfully have obtained from the PTO by literal claims. The doctrine of equivalents exists to prevent a fraud on a patent, Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608, 70 S.Ct. 854, 856, 94 L.Ed. 1097 (1950), not to give a patentee something which he could not lawfully have obtained from the PTO had he tried. Thus, since prior art always limits what an inventor could have claimed, it limits the range of permissible equivalents of a claim.

904 F.2d at 684.



直接侵權與間接侵權


Akamai Technologies, Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc. (Fed. Cir., Augist 13, 2015)：多人成立直接侵權的前提，是所有行為可歸責於單一行為人：

Where more than one actor is involved in practicing the steps, a court must determine whether the acts of one are attributable to the other such that a single entity is responsible for the infringement.  We will hold an entity responsible for others' performance of method steps in two sets of circumstances: (1) where that entity directs or controls others' performance, and (2) where the actors form a joint enterprise.

[Fairsky's Patent Memo之前關於本案的討論]
[Knowledge Repository之前關於本案的討論]


Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060 (2011)：(1) 知悉所引誘的行為構成侵權，是引誘侵權的要件；(2) 「刻意無視原則」是「知悉」要件成立的原因之一：

[W]e now hold that induced infringement under § 271(b) requires knowledge that the induced acts constitute patent infringement.

131 S. Ct. at 2068.

While the Courts of Appeals articulate the doctrine of willful blindness in slightly different ways, all appear to agree on two basic requirements: (1) the defendant must subjectively believe that there is a high probability that a fact exists and (2) the defendant must take deliberate actions to avoid learning of that fact. We think these requirements give willful blindness an appropriately limited scope that surpasses recklessness and negligence.

131 S. Ct. at 2070.


Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 135 S.Ct. 1920 (2015)：專利無效的信念不能阻卻引誘侵權的主觀要件成立：

Invalidity is an affirmative defense that “can preclude enforcement of a patent against otherwise infringing conduct.” 6A Chisum on Patents § 19.01, p. 19–5 (2015). An accused infringer can, of course, attempt to prove that the patent in suit is invalid; if the patent is indeed invalid, and shown to be so under proper procedures, there is no liability. See i4i, supra, at –––– – ––––, 131 S.Ct., at 2247–2248. That is because invalidity is not a defense to infringement, it is a defense to liability. And because of that fact, a belief as to invalidity cannot negate the scienter required for induced infringement.

[Knowledge Repository之前關於本案的討論]


Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs. Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2111 (2014)：引誘侵權成立的前提，是直接侵權成立：

Assuming without deciding that the Federal Circuit's holding in Muniauction is correct, there has simply been no infringement of the method in which respondents have staked out an interest, because the performance of all the patent's steps is not attributable to any one person. And, as both the Federal Circuit and respondents admit, where there has been no direct infringement, there can be no inducement of infringement under § 271(b).